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1.  Introduction 
The prospects of integration with the European Union 
drove the reform and ‘transition’ processes in Central, 
Eastern, and South-Eastern Europe (CESEE)  and even 
in some of the neighbouring countries and regions 
with much more limited prospects for membership. 
This vision provided an important ‘focusing device’ for 
policy makers and the public alike in initiating institu-
tional change, following certain concepts in eco-
nomic policy design and affecting economic and 
other behavioural change. This has led to a growth 
model based on integration with the EU-15 that sup-
ported sustained ‘catching-up’ in productivity and 
income levels (see Figure 1), although it was inter-
rupted in some CESEE countries by ‘secondary transi-
tion crises’ in the 1990s .  
The international financial and economic crisis which 
erupted in full after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 
September 2008, interrupted the stability of the catch-
ing-up processes in CESEE economies. This Policy Brief 
shall concentrate on the prospects of resumption of 
growth and on the type of ‘growth model’ one can 
envisage for the region. The challenge in a discussion 
of a ‘new’ or ‘redirected growth model’ is two-fold: 
First, we have to make sure we understand whether 
the conditions for growth in CESEE have changed at 
all and over which time horizon. For the purposes of 
the analysis in this Policy Note we shall distinguish quite 
carefully the challenges for the short run (i.e. how to 
get growth going again) from those in the medium to 
longer run (i.e. a horizon beyond the next three to four 
years) and relate these to expected behavioural ad-
justments occurring both within the countries of the 
region in the wake of the current economic crisis as 
well as to changes in the external environment. The 
second challenge refers to capturing the differentia-
tion across the countries of the region, as it emerges 
very clearly that different countries and country 
groups both followed different paths prior to the crisis 
and face different challenges in the wake of the crisis. 
These issues will occupy us in Sections 2 to 4. In the fi-
nal Section 5 we discuss the policy agenda required 
by the situation which arose from the crisis. 
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2.  A ‘new growth model’ in the 
making  
Taking up the issue of a ‘new growth model’, we must 
delineate first what characterized the ‘old model’ in 
order to understand which features are likely to 
change as a result of either changed characteristics 
and reactions of market participants resulting from the 
crisis or because policy mak-
ers face different constraints 
and embark on a change in 
their interventions.  
The older growth model was 
accompanied and in parts 
determined by a fast at-
tempt to reach candidate 
and then membership 
status of the EU as quickly as 
possible: an up-shot of this 
attempt was the choice of 
a model of  ‘catching-up’ 
which adopted a very high 
degree of liberalization in 
external (and internal) eco-
nomic relations. Trade was 
liberalized, there was a 
commitment to free interna-
tional capital movements 
(in all its forms) and financial 
markets were opened up to 
foreign financial institutions. 
Foreign banks attained in 
most countries of the region 
dominant market positions. 
Liberalization and openness 
in external economic rela-
tions coincided with a clas-
sic process of ‘conver-
gence’, i.e. CEE economies 
embarked on a growth 
path with rates substantially above those of their 
Western neighbours even though such catching-up 
processes were at times (e.g. Czech Republic and 
Slovakia in the late 1990s, Poland in the early years of 
the 2000s, Hungary after that) interrupted by policy 
mistakes (such as too early peg in the exchange rate, 
at times mistakes in monetary policy or profligate fis-
cal spending) or by misalignments in wage and pro-
ductivity dynamics. 
 
Note: ME; RS data for 1995-1990 refer to CS 
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Figure 1: GDP at constant prices  
Average annual growth rates, 1995-2002 and 2002-2008, in %  
        1995-2002           2002-2008 
 
Figure 2: Industrial production  
cumulative change, 1995-1990, 2000-1990, 2008-1990 
Source: wiiw Annual Database incorporating national statistics, Eurostat.   2. A ‘new growth model’ in the making 
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Over the period 2002-2008 (see Figure 1) all CESEE 
economies experienced significantly higher growth 
than countries in Western Europe. Underlying this 
growth performance is the scope of any lower in-
come, lower productivity economy to benefit from 
technology transfer (to be interpreted in a wider sense 
including the adoption of better organizational prac-
tices, improvements in institutions and behavioural 
practices) which is the main driver behind ‘conver-
gence’ processes. Comparative growth accounting 
exercises (see e.g. World Bank, 2008) show that 
growth in TFP (total factor productivity) was by far the 
dominant factor explaining overall growth (see Box 1). 
In the case of the CESEE economies the speed of such 
‘technology’ transfer was strongly supported by the 
anchoring in pre-accession and accession arrange-
ments with the EU. This anchoring supported the fast 
and substantial influx of foreign investors which acted 
as important conduit of that transfer. Low relative unit 
labour costs combined with relatively high human 
capital endowment which made the region attractive 
to foreign investors; this induced fast technology trans-
fer, access to high-income markets and the possibility 
to integrate into cross-border production networks. 
Some of the CESEEs (in particular, the five central 
European countries, CE) experienced a period of re-
industrialization (i.e. fast growth in industrial production 
and in industrial exports) after the earlier period of de-
industrialization at the beginning of transition. Further-
more, the CE economies showed evidence of signifi-
cant qualitative upgrading of their industrial and ex-
port structures (see Landesmann and Stehrer, 2009 
and Fabrizio, Igan and Mody, 2007) 1
The Southeastern European (SEE) economies, on the 
other hand, had gone through a longer period of 
economic and political turbulence and hence they 
embarked on a process of renewed growth with a 
considerable time lag. They had to struggle with the 
long-term impact of a much more protracted period 
of industrial production decline (see Figure 2) which 
opened up a sustained gap in trade balances. This 
had grave implications for their vulnerability to exter-
nal shocks to which we shall return below. The Baltic 
countries experienced phenomenal growth from the 
second half of the 1990s onwards, and in line with 
many SEE countries adopted various versions of fixed 
exchange rate regimes.  The purpose was often to 
cover for the lack of trust in domestic monetary au-
thorities and to avoid large exchange rate fluctua-
tions that can characterise shallow foreign exchange 
.  
                                                            
1   There were also other factors at work in the success-
ful ‘growth models’ of the CEs: 
•  changes in educational structures and hence the skill 
structure of the ’future’ labour force (for this see Applica 
and wiiw, 2009); 
•  a change in sectoral and regional economic structures 
which meant difficult adaptation processes, but this re-
sulted in more forward-looking patterns of sectoral and 
regional growth (see e.g. Roemisch, 2009). 
markets. By fixing the exchange rate, these countries 
may have also wanted to speed-up financial and 
monetary integration with the eurozone. This choice of 
exchange rate regime played an important role in the 
type of imbalances which developed and contrib-
uted strongly to sustain and accentuate the problem 
with deteriorating trade balances. 
The importance of total factor productivity (TFP) in the 
CESEE region 
Total factor productivity (TFP) was the dominant com-
ponent amongst growth determinants in CESEE before 
the crisis, as indicated in Figure B1.2  The figure sug-
gests that TFP growth was faster in CESEE countries in 
1999-2005 than in any other region of the world, ex-
cept China and CIS.3
Figure B1 Total factor productivity (TFP) developments 
  A crucial question is whether 
such high TFP growth can be expected to resume af-
ter the crisis.  
(A)  Change in TFP, 1990-2005   
  
(B)  Components of growth in different regions of the world in 1999-
2005 
 
Note: CIS = Commonwealth of Independent States; LAC = Latin 
America and the Caribbean; SEE = South Eastern Europe; the Region 
= all transition countries. 
Source: Figure 5A and Figure 5B from World Bank (2008), p. 11. 
                                                            
2   TFP is measured as the “residual” part of total out-
put growth not explained by capital and labour. Its meas-
urement is even shakier for CESEE and other transition coun-
tries than for advanced economies due to the lack of reli-
able capital stock data. Furthermore, TFP can capture cycli-
cal movements in output as well. 
3   Iradian (2007) reaches a very similar conclusion.   3. Sustainability of growth in Central and Eastern Europe – differentiation across economies 
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Figure 3: Trade balances of goods and services and income balances, 1995-2009 
in % of GDP 
   Trade balance in % of GDP   Income in % of GDP  
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Note: Notice that scales vary across figures. 
Source: wiiw Annual Database incorporating national statistics, Eurostat. 
   3. Sustainability of growth in Central and Eastern Europe – differentiation across economies 
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3.  Sustainability of growth in 
Central and Eastern Europe – 
differentiation across 
economies 
Together with a move towards a sustained high-
growth and catching-up phase in the new millennium, 
we saw amongst CESEE economies examples of real 
improvements in conditions for long-run sustainability 
both with respect to external accounts and fiscal 
conditions. As regards external accounts, five Central 
European (CE) economies witnessed improvements in 
trade accounts over the past decade even in a pe-
riod when these economies experienced positive 
growth differentials relative to their main trading part-
ners (see Figure 3); deficits in current accounts were 
mostly due to negative entries in the income ac-
counts which reflected the profits made by interna-
tional investors1
On the other hand, as also emerges from Figure 3, 
there is a range of economies, especially in South-
eastern Europe and in the Baltics, where the evidence 
did not point towards external sustainability. Trade 
accounts continued to deteriorate and transfers were 
insufficient to compensate for this; as a result these 
countries witnessed – before the crisis – at times dra-
matically worsening current accounts. These econo-
mies suffer from persistent weaknesses of their trad-
able sectors. The underlying issue here is the dramatic 
fall in industrial production in the early phase of transi-
tion from which these economies did not properly re-
cover so far (see earlier Figure 2). Particularly prob-
lematic in this respect are over-valued exchange 
rates (see Holzner, 2006; Egert, 2005; Brender and 
Pisani, 2010) either due to exchange rate regime 
choices and associated monetary policies, or in some 
countries entrenched by a type of Dutch disease 
partly due to the importance of remittances, and 
partly based on the importance of the tourism sector, 
all of which hinder the development of a sufficiently 
sized and competitive export sector. 
. This has been combined with qualita-
tive up-grading in their export structures as discussed 
earlier. Hence, these five CE economies were on a 
robust path towards sustainability of external ac-
counts and the main worry was periodic strong up-
ward pressures on the exchange rate through strong 
capital inflows. In some countries, the relative move-
ments of productivity and labour costs also impacted 
upon competitiveness and external accounts in spe-
cific periods. 
From this viewpoint, the crucial issue for sustainable 
catching-up processes in Central, Eastern and South-
eastern European economies is to support conditions 
                                                            
1   Not only repatriated profits but also profits which 
are retained and reinvested by foreign firms in the host 
economy appear as negative entries in the income ac-
counts.  
for the successful development of the tradable sector 
so as to achieve convergence without incurring 
strong current account vulnerabilities.  
The conditions for an ‘adapted growth model’ in the 
light of the after-effects of the current crisis should 
therefore take account of the rather different situa-
tions found in the two groups of economies: (i) the 
relatively successful CEE economies and (ii) the 
economies in the Baltics and in South-eastern Europe 
which moved along an unsustainable path of external 
disequilibrium even before the crisis2
Figure 4 gives the composition of capital flows in the 
capital accounts. While CEE economies (with the ex-
ception of Slovenia in the most recent period) showed 
no signs of a strong bout of net credit inflows outstrip-
ping FDI inflows, this was a striking feature of the Baltic 
economies. Bulgaria and Romania experienced sharp 
increases in both net credit inflows and FDI inflows. 
Baltic and SEE economies were hence strongly vul-
nerable to a change in financial market risk assess-
ment as happened in the recent crisis.  
. Both these two 
types of economies will have to adjust to changes 
brought about by the crisis, but the magnitude of the 
challenge is quite different. Before discussing these 
adjustments let us however point to further differences 
between the two groups of economies:  
Figure 5 reveals further differences regarding the allo-
cation of foreign direct investment across different 
sectors of the economy. What we see is that four of 
the CEE economies have a share of FDI stock in 
manufacturing  –  a sector with a high trade share – 
which is above or close to 40%; in most of the Baltic 
and Southeast European economies it is substantially 
below that. On the other hand, FDI shares are particu-
larly high in a number of the SEE and Baltic economies 
in financial intermediation and in real estate. Hence 
there is a significant difference in the roles which FDI 
played in the different groups of economies in sup-
porting the build-up industrial capacities and in its fo-
cus on tradable vs. non-tradable sectors. This supports 
the notion that the activity of foreign investors in the 
Baltics and the Southeast European economies con-
tributed much less towards the build-up of a competi-
tive and sufficiently sized tradable sector than it did in 
the CEs. 
                                                            
2 The principal issue in the CIS economies is lacking trade and 
production diversification and a lock-in in political-economic 
structures which are linked with this phenomenon; however, 
we shall not pursue this issue further over here (see, Landes-
mann, 2008). 
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Figure 4: Net capital flows 
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Note: * Hungary 2008 excl. IMF loans. Notice that scales vary across figures. 
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Figure 5: FDI stock by activities 
as of December 2007, shares in % 
 
 
Note. Data for SK refer to 2006, data for AL refer to 2004.  
Source: wiiw FDI Database. 
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Figure 6: Savings and investment 
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Finally, we want to point to differences in the sizes and 
characteristics of savings-investment gaps in the two 
groups of economies. As can be seen from Figure 6, 
these are most striking in relation to private sector sav-
ings-investment short-falls which had to be covered 
through foreign borrowing. Roughly the same group-
ing of economies emerges in this respect. Hence 
strong growth of net credit inflows and large savings-
investment gaps of the private sector in Baltic and SEE 
economies before the crisis indicate a problem of ef-
fectiveness of monetary policy and capital market 
regulation.  
In summary, the analysis indicates that it would be 
wrong to speak of uniform problems with the ‘growth 
model’ across the entire range of Central and Eastern 
European economies and hence suggestions regard-
ing the ‘redesign’ of such a growth model must take 
such differences into account.  
On the one hand, there is a group of Central Euro-
pean economies which are not immune to incur pol-
icy mistakes (even severe ones such as the fiscal per-
formance of Hungary over the past decade), but 
these economies have mostly been on track to deal 
successfully with one of the very important issues 
which have led to the development of unsustainable 
imbalances before the crisis. Their performance over 
the period prior to the crisis has shown that they have 
built up a reasonably competitive trading sector 
which got reflected in manageable current accounts 
and a continued interest of foreign investors in that 
sector which has also had the added benefit that the 
composition of capital inflows reflected this interest.  
On the other hand, we presented evidence for the 
weaknesses of the tradable sectors in all other CESEE 
economies. Nonetheless these economies have also 
been able to achieve very high growth rates in the 
period before the crisis, but this growth performance 
stood on shaky legs and cannot continue in this form 
following a recovery from the crisis. Future growth in 
CESEEs will unlikely be supported by the extent of cur-
rent account deficits and the inflow of credits we 
have witnessed in these economies before the crisis. 
Most of these economies went through a serious ad-
justment in current account developments during the 
crisis which reflected sharp drops in GDP and the 
‘sudden stop’ reaction of international financial flows. 
However, the crucial issue is whether there are ad-
justment processes at work which will allow the re-
sumption of growth without incurring severe external 




                                                            
1 See, for example, the April 2010 World Economic Outlook of 
the IMF. 
4.  Redesigning the growth model 
in the light if changed internal 
and external conditions 
In the following we shall discuss two sets of factors 
which will impact the ‘growth model’ in the CESEE re-
gion. We shall refer, on the one hand, to 
-  internal  behavioural adjustments and new con-
straints and, on the other hand, to 
-  changed external circumstances  
We start with the internal behavioural adjustments 
which are likely to prevail for a time following the re-
cent crisis and commence with financial market de-
velopments. 
The CESEE region has been the beneficiary of very 
large capital inflows, much higher (in relation to GDP) 
than was the case for other emerging market 
economies globally. In a sub-set of economies there 
was also evidence of very fast credit growth leading 
to substantial private sector debt. An important fall-
out of the crisis was that net capital imports slowed 
down or came to a complete halt, credits became 
much more difficult to obtain, and the private sector 
started to embark upon a process of de-leveraging. 
The crisis revealed significant earlier miscalculations in 
risk perceptions both in relation to asset values, in the 
evaluation of balance-sheet positions of some of the 
important actors in financial markets and of default 
risks of households and of businesses under changed 
circumstances; an important element of such risks re-
lates to exchange rates. Finally, given these changed 
risk perceptions, the evaluation of sovereign public 
sector debt also changed. 
A shared evaluation of the outcome  of the current 
crisis is that risk perceptions are not going to revert to 
pre-crisis levels. If risk perceptions are going to remain 
at a higher level over a medium-run horizon, this 
means that credit conditions will remain tighter than 
they were before the crisis; this relates to both lending 
behaviour within the countries but also in relation to 
the outside world. In addition, the crisis brought about 
worse balance-sheet positions of banks and of house-
holds and this also leads to more cautious lending 
and borrowing behaviour. Hence one of the most im-
portant outcomes of the current crisis will be that tran-
sition and catching-up economies have to adjust to 
more difficult financing conditions, both concerning 
finance from domestic financial institutions as well as 
from the outside world. Economists will, however, find 
it hard to predict how long higher risk perceptions are 
going to last. 
The second likely effect of the crisis is the behaviour of 
the household sector itself which has and will further 
experience a deterioration of its own debt and/or fi-
nancing position. There is considerable variation 
across the different CESEE economies. In some 
economies the levels (and/or rates of increase) of   4. Redesigning the growth model in the light if changed internal and external conditions 
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household debt have been high or very high in the 
build-up to the crisis (Baltics, Romania, Croatia, Hun-
gary) and this indeed has been one important reason 
for the vehemence of the transmission of the global 
financial crisis to this region. In three other economies 
(Albania, Poland and Serbia) levels of household debt 
might not have been that high, but depreciation of 
the national currencies led to a jump of household in-
debtedness in the cases where loans were taken out 
in foreign currency, though depreciation largely 
proved to be temporary. The implication of these fi-
nancial constraints is that households have to rely 
more on own income sources and might be forced to 
reschedule loans implying higher savings rates. Other 
households will likely also undergo a process of volun-
tary de-leveraging, i.e. attempts to reduce the levels 
of their debt as lower expected income flows imply a 
lower longer-run wealth position of households. All this 
points to a rise in household savings rates  in CESEE 
economies over the medium term.  
Thirdly,  fiscal positions have and will significantly 
worsen in the course of the crisis: lower incomes re-
duce tax revenues and the economic recession in-
creases public expenditure commitments. Further-
more, some of the public debt is in foreign currency 
and hence the largely temporary depreciation of cur-
rencies affected public debt/GDP ratios. In a number 
of countries there was also an increase in debt to IFIs 
(IMF agreements). Hence although most CESEE 
economies (with the major exception of Hungary) 
went into the crisis with rather low public debt levels 
and governments could feel confident in a climate of 
high growth and relatively low interest rates that this 
debt could easily be serviced, the outcome of the cri-
sis has significantly changed this perspective. While 
sustainability of fiscal positions did not seem a prob-
lem in a period of high growth, trend nominal appre-
ciation of the currency and low interest rates, this sce-
nario has now changed dramatically. 
As regards fiscal policy, we want to mention two pos-
sible policy scenarios in so far as they affect medium- 
and long-run growth. 
In principle it is possible to have both a positive or a 
negative outlook on fiscal policy as it affects eco-
nomic growth: The positive outlook would be that the 
stronger fiscal constraints felt as a result of the crisis 
would lead to a streamlining of public expenditure 
programmes. This could put pressure on reforming a 
host of social expenditure programmes in such a way 
that they get more targeted and the efficiency of 
administrative procedures gets improved. Further-
more, governments could use the opportunity to redi-
rect resources towards growth-enhancing spending 
programmes. A negative outlook would be that pres-
sures on public spending would lead to a relative ne-
glect of public investment in favour of defending ex-
isting government programmes rather than their re-
form.  
To summarize: The medium-run impact of the eco-
nomic crisis upon CESEE will show up in 
-  more difficult internal and external financing con-
ditions 
-  de-leveraging processes and higher savings rates 
of the household sector 
-  a worsened public debt situation and increased 
pressures to reform public expenditure pro-
grammes 
 
Let us now move on and discuss the second set of 
factors, namely changes in external conditions which 
need to be factored in when redesigning the ‘growth 
model’ of the CESEEs. The following three factors are 
particularly relevant in this respect: 
 
(i)  Drop in the trend growth path of the main Eu-
ropean export markets: 
The expected longer-term impact of the crisis on po-
tential growth paths is not only relevant for the CESEE 
region, but also for the main export markets of the 
countries in this region, namely Western Europe2
 
 and 
this in turn will be a growth-dampening factor for the 
CESEE countries. 
(ii)  Reforms in the financial architecture at na-
tional, European and global levels 
The experience of the crisis has shown that CESEE 
countries were very vulnerable to instabilities and 
shocks to global financial markets and, in the final 
analysis, these were the causes of the rather dramatic 
and unexpected, interruption of growth processes in 
CESEE economies.  
Changes in the financial architecture will likely go in 
the direction of strengthening the capital-base of any 
future credit expansion, as well as empowering regu-
latory authorities to monitor macro-stability issues of 
financial (particularly banking) institutions. In all these 
areas, the growth processes in the CESEE region could 
benefit from such changes in regulation as in the past 
there were signs of overheated and misdirected ex-
pansion of credit (particularly when borrowing led to 
unsustainable bubbles) and lack of effective instru-
ments which could be administered by domestic 
regulatory authorities particularly with respect to cross-
border financial market transactions. Any agreements 
on regulatory reforms which tackle these issues of 
cross-border financial market integration might be 
beneficial for the characteristics of financial interme-
diation in the CESEE region.  
 
                                                            
2   See various publication analysing the impact of the 
crisis on potential output: Boewer and Turini (2009), European 
Commission (2009), Fouceri and Mourourgane (2009).    5. Policy suggestions to support a ‘reoriented’ growth model 
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(iii)  New and differentiated positions vis-a-vis EMU 
membership 
The experience of the crisis, particularly the fact that 
serious external accounts imbalances and processes 
of credit expansion made CESEE economies prone to 
contagion effects, has produced the feeling that non-
Euro CESEE countries are indeed very vulnerable to 
financial market shocks. This had a number of con-
trary effects: Within the Euro-system, it strengthened 
the sentiment that any quick enlargement of the Euro-
group would add to financial instability of the group 
as a whole3
 
. On the other side, the events have in-
creased the desire of some would-be-members (Bal-
tics, some Balkan economies) to join as fast as possi-
ble to obtain the support in terms of financial and 
monetary stability which full Euro-membership sup-
plies. Lastly, the differential experiences of ‘fix-ex’ vs. 
‘flex-ex’ countries during the crisis have also strength-
ened the position of some (mostly ‘flex-ex’) countries 
that giving up their own currency too soon deprives 
the economy of an important instrument to absorb 
shocks. Hence the likelihood of earlier or later entry 
has become much more diverse across CESEE 
economies as a result of the crisis and the balance is 
likely to tilt towards a stricter application of rules for 
EMU entry. 
5.  Policy suggestions to support a 
‘reoriented’ growth model 
The main assets of the CESEE countries – their mem-
bership, pre-accession status or simply proximity to the 
EU, and all that this implies in terms of institution build-
ing and market access; as well as their relatively high 
human capital endowment and scope for productiv-
ity catching-up – that existed before the crisis will con-
tinue to prevail in the future and provide ground for 
optimism in terms of their growth prospects. On the 
other hand, some of the severe structural weaknesses 
of countries in the region have not disappeared and 
policy mistakes that were made in the run-up to the 
crisis  –  in the area of financial, monetary and fiscal 
policies  –  will have to be corrected in order to im-
prove the sustainability of the growth process. Unfor-
tunately such correction will have to take place in an 
environment of deteriorated external and internal 
conditions (see discussion in section 4 above).  
Several policy suggestions emerge from the above 
analysis for the resumption of growth in the CESEE re-
gion and also point to the important differences rele-
vant for different sub-groups of economies. 
 
 
                                                            
3   This position was further significantly strengthened 
by the strains which the post-crisis developments in the IPSG 
countries – Ireland, Portugal, Spain and particularly Greece – 
generated within the euro-bloc. 
(i)  Adjust to somewhat weaker reliance on net 
capital imports 
Lower net capital imports (especially the net credit 
component) can be addressed in two ways: a) re-
duce the savings-investment gap of the private sector 
and – in due course as public finances deteriorate – 
through longer-run fiscal consolidation and b) make a 
sustained attempt to improve the current accounts 
though improvements in the competitiveness of the 
tradable sector. It is clear from our analysis that the 
adjustment to lower net capital imports is most severe 
in the economies which relied most heavily on such 
flows and in which the current accounts and savings-
investment gaps were in serious disequilibrium. This 
means tackling the underlying factors which led  to 
sustained external imbalances: in quite a few cases 
this means dealing with the issue of seriously ‘mis-
aligned real exchange rates’ which is a particularly 
difficult issue to deal with in pegged or fixed ex-
change rate regimes without devaluation. Even under 
flexible exchange rate conditions, difficult phases of 
misaligned real exchange rates have emerged and 
this has to do with two issues: one are overly strong 
pressures on nominal exchange rate appreciations 
which are connected with financial market behaviour 
and for which better arrangements should result from 
financial market reforms; the other are wage-
productivity dynamics which require improved ar-
rangements for labour market bargaining systems. The 
issue of savings-investment imbalances is, of course, 
also closely linked to the difficulty of conducting 
monetary policy in economies with highly integrated 
cross-border financial markets.  
Over the coming years, the CEEC region will receive 
increased flows from the EU budget as they either be-
come full recipients of Structural Funds and other EU 
policy programmes or – in the case of other econo-
mies  –  the changes in pre-accession or candidate 
status might lead to an increase in such flows. This is a 
counter-weight to the more difficult situation with re-
spect to private sector capital inflows. 
 
(ii)  Adjust to higher household savings rates but 
use these savings in the most growth-
enhancing manner 
A likely outcome of the crisis will be a medium-term 
increase in the household savings rates in CESEE 
economies. Such an increase is to be welcomed for 
the longer run as, in many cases, savings rates were 
rather low in CESEE economies by international com-
parison and also low savings rates were the cause of 
severe imbalances in a number of economies. How-
ever, an upward adjustment of household savings 
rates will ceteris paribus lead to a medium-run prob-
lem of dampened domestic demand. This can be 
compensated through increased fiscal stimulus 
and/or a drive to support the tradable sector and 
hence net exports. Hence the issue of adjusting to 
higher medium-run domestic household savings rates 
is linked to the discussion on the role of fiscal policy in   5. Policy suggestions to support a ‘reoriented’ growth model 
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CESEE in the course of the economic crisis and in its 
aftermath. 
Furthermore, (see (iv) below), a sustained re-launch of 
growth in CESEE will require a more efficient use  of 
savings than in the past. Policy instruments (credit 
support for SMEs, credit facilities to support skill acquisi-
tion, re-training and new technology adoption; con-
trols on mortgage lending) could be used to make 
sure that savings flow in the direction that supports a 
sustained growth process and tackles the main weak-
nesses in external accounts (see also iv below). 
 
(iii)  Support the re-launch of the stalled credit sys-
tem but ensure it operates with  improved 
regulatory mechanisms. 
Like in the more advanced Western economies it is 
vital for a sustained recovery that the credit system 
functions properly again. Hence there is an essential 
short-run challenge to reduce credit constraints to 
support the resumption of economic activity in an en-
vironment in which the private sector suffers from debt 
overhang. The expected deleveraging process in an 
environment in which the balance sheets of national 
and international banks are weak and the authority 
for bank restructuring is split up across national borders 
is a major challenge for monetary policy authorities at 
national and European levels. On the other hand, 
there is also the longer-run task to put in place im-
proved regulatory mechanisms with regard to credit 
growth and also in credit allocation. Both these two 
issues are crucial for the prospects of recovery and 
the avoidance of recurrence of misallocations and 
imbalances which characterized the situation in quite 
a few economies before the crisis. Given past experi-
ence, it will in this context also be important to support 
a shift in banks’ lending policies in the direction of 
more credit to the enterprise sector and less to the 
household sector. 
 
(iv) Aim at the sustainability of fiscal balances, in 
part by redirecting public expenditure pro-
grammes in a growth-enhancing direction. 
The crisis has led to serious increases in public debt 
positions in the CEECs although public debt levels re-
main significantly lower than the average in Western 
Europe. Nonetheless, given the more difficult financ-
ing possibilities of such debt following the crisis, atten-
tion to sustainability issues is important; this must how-
ever be weighed against the need for fiscal stimulus 
programmes in the shorter run to compensate for ris-
ing savings rates in the household sector and the diffi-
cult exporting conditions. Improvements in the struc-
ture of expenditure programmes and especially a re-
direction towards growth-enhancing items (educa-
tion, infrastructure, etc.) are certainly called for.  
(v)  Policies directed at ‘growth drivers’ 
Given the importance of strengthening the tradable 
sector in many of the CEEC economies, the whole 
host of policies running under the headings of human 
capital policy, technology policy, industrial and re-
gional policy should be employed. They have particu-
lar relevance for economies which have so far not 
been able to reverse the early deep process of de-
industrialization and where investment patterns fa-
voured the expansion of non-tradable as compared 
to tradable sectors. Such policies may to some extent 
compensate for a reduced inflow of FDI which was 
the main agent of industrial structural up-grading be-
fore the crisis and may make the region  attractive 
when foreign investment resumes and cross-border 
production integration proceeds again. The various 
EU regional and other policy programmes should be 
used in a complementary fashion to support such 
policies. Design of such policies and the timing of 
spending should be coordinated with Commission 
Services in such a way that they support a timely re-
launch of growth and support a sustainable growth 
trajectory. Governance mechanisms to ensure that 
programmes are used efficiently need to be put into 
place or strengthened. 
 
(vi) Deal with demographic aspects through la-
bour market and educational policies but 
also by developing an active (human capital-
enhancing) migration policy 
CESEEs have – in most cases – to cope with an even 
worse demographic prospect in terms of ageing than 
most Western European countries. Policies directed at 
increasing the utilization of the available labour force 
(activity and employment rates) as well as improving 
its quality through human capital enhancing policies 
will have to be an important item on the policy 
agenda. On top of that, CESEEs which had for long 
been net-emigrant countries, will have to learn the art 
of successful (and human capital enhancing) migra-
tion policy.   6. Literature 
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